Editor’s note: The following is a guest post by Kent Lawson, CEO of VPN vendor Private Communications Corporation.
On Oct. 5, Microsoft updated its report on CaptiveCrunch, a campaign it attributed to Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of the Russian state-backed group Midnight Blizzard, after seeing the group resume activity on Sept. 29. The group manipulated traffic on captive portal networks that hotels and other hospitality venues offer guests, redirecting travelers to phishing pages and serving them malware disguised as software updates.
Headlines focused on hotel Wi-Fi and stolen credentials. The bigger story was the misconception that cloud applications and encrypted connections take the risk out of untrusted networks. Public Wi-Fi was never designed with your business's security in mind.
For years, employees were taught to look for the padlock icon before entering a password online. If a website uses HTTPS, the thinking went, the connection is secure. That lesson stuck so well that it's easy to stop thinking twice before connecting to public Wi-Fi to check email, pull up customer records or log into business applications. Google considered the misunderstanding serious enough to drop the padlock from Chrome's address bar in 2023, noting that nearly all phishing sites use HTTPS, too.
That's the real problem. HTTPS encrypts the connection between a browser and a website, which helps keep anyone from reading or modifying that traffic in transit. It was never designed to secure the network itself.
Employees see only the padlock, but attackers see everything around it. CaptiveCrunch shows why that distinction matters. Microsoft reported that the attackers manipulated DNS and HTTP traffic on hospitality networks and captive portals to send travelers to attacker-controlled pages. Those pages can prompt users to approve malicious sign-in requests or run malware.
None of that requires breaking HTTPS. The attack works on the network around the connection and on the trust users place in what they see on their screens. That matters because many organizations have reduced network security to a single question: Is the traffic encrypted?
If the browser says the connection is encrypted, it's easy to assume the problem has been solved. It hasn't.
HTTPS protects a communication channel between a browser and a web service. It doesn't make the network carrying that traffic trustworthy, and it doesn't protect every other interaction taking place on the device.
An attacker with access to an untrusted network has other options. DNS manipulation can steer users toward credential harvesting sites. Misconfigured systems can expose services. Devices may have unpatched vulnerabilities. Authentication workflows can become targets.
Reframing Wi-Fi
The security conversation around public Wi-Fi has been framed too narrowly. The question isn't simply whether someone can read encrypted web traffic. The more useful question is what opportunities an untrusted network creates and which controls still work if that environment is compromised.
That question matters more now that so much work happens outside the office.
During a normal workday, employees move between Microsoft 365, Teams, Salesforce, accounting systems, CRM platforms, file repositories, remote management tools and other services. Those systems don't all have the same security characteristics.
Some are modern cloud platforms built around current security standards. Others are legacy applications designed when employees, applications and data mostly lived inside a corporate network. Some organizations tightly manage devices and identity. Others have a mix of corporate and personal devices, older applications and inconsistent security policies.
Remote work carries those differences into environments the organization doesn't control.
Employees who once spent most of their time behind corporate firewalls may now just as easily work from a hotel lobby, airport, coffee shop, coworking space or home network. Business data routinely travels across networks organizations neither own nor manage.
That changes the security equation.
Businesses can no longer assume they know where employees connect from. A security architecture that works behind a corporate firewall may behave differently on a hotel network. Controls that work for a modern cloud application may not address the risks of an older internal application.
Layered security
No single technology resolves all of those differences. That's why layered security matters.
HTTPS remains essential. Organizations should keep relying on strong encryption to protect browser sessions and application traffic. But encryption is one control within a broader security model, not evidence that the entire environment is secure.
Other layers can include strong authentication, endpoint security, timely patching, secure DNS, network segmentation, device management, application controls, monitoring, access policies and employee awareness. In CaptiveCrunch's case, Microsoft specifically recommends phishing-resistant authentication such as passkeys and blocking the device code sign-in flow where it isn't needed. Which controls deserve the most emphasis depends on the organization.
A small accounting firm with employees who occasionally work from home has different requirements from a consulting company whose employees travel constantly. A manufacturer relying on older internal applications has different exposure from a software company that runs almost entirely on cloud services.
Security architecture has to reflect those differences. That's particularly important for small and midsize businesses, which often don't have dedicated security teams evaluating every layer of their infrastructure.
The MSP angle
For managed service providers, CaptiveCrunch is a reason to help SMB customers check whether their remote-work security holds up when employees connect through networks the business doesn't control. Rather than treating hotel Wi-Fi as a general awareness issue, MSPs can start a broader conversation about access, identity, device security and the potential impact of a compromised connection.
There’s a harder lesson in the October update, too. Microsoft said the renewed activity lines up with Black Lotus Labs research implicating multiple hospitality MSPs, and that the attackers’ continued access to those upstream providers likely helped them get back up and running quickly. The captive portal a traveler trusts is often run by a service provider the hotel trusts.
Many SMBs may still believe public Wi-Fi is relatively safe because "everything uses HTTPS now." HTTPS has dramatically improved internet security. But that view is incomplete.
MSPs can help customers understand what HTTPS protects and what it doesn't. They can look at where employees work, which applications they use, what devices they use, how identities are authenticated and which protections still work when the underlying network can't be trusted.
That assessment shouldn't begin with a particular product or technology. It should begin with the customer's environment.
Where are employees connecting from? Which devices do they use to reach business applications? What happens if one of those networks is compromised? Which applications would be exposed? Can the business detect suspicious sign-ins, risky authentication activity or signs of endpoint compromise? Which security controls would keep working? Where are the gaps?
The answers can help MSPs prioritize improvements based on each customer's environment, risk and resources. They're also a better starting point than recommending a technology before understanding the problem it needs to solve.
Remote work has changed the assumptions underneath traditional business security. Applications are more distributed. Employees move between networks constantly. Attackers don't need to defeat every security control. They need to find the one that doesn't hold up when the environment changes.
For SMBs, the lesson isn't to stop using hotel Wi-Fi, abandon HTTPS or adopt one particular security technology. It's to stop treating any single security control as the whole security architecture.
MSPs can help by finding the gaps, making sure controls work together and fitting access to each customer's needs and risk profile.
The padlock still matters. The environment around it matters, too.